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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NELDEN C. NIELSEN 
and 
MARY Y. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
PHILIP WARREN, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 960088 CA 
Argument Priority (15) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter by assignment 
from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that plaintiffs' action was "not 
properly founded on contract"? 
2. Did the trial court err in holding that Utah Code Ann §78-12-44 did 
not apply to plaintiffs' action despite two written acknowledgments of defendant's 
debt to plaintiffs? 
1 
The standard of review for both issues is that this court need accord no 
deference to the lower court's said holdings because they were both conclusions of 
law. Kelson v. Salt Lake County. 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or 
promise to pay. In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or 
interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or 
claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be 
brought within the period prescribed for the same after such payment, 
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right of action is barred by the 
provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or ground 
of defense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-108 Payable on demand. 
Instruments payable on demand include those payable at sight or on presentation and 
those in which no time for payment is stated. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal and judgment entered on or 
about September 20, 1995, in the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, 
State of Utah, by the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, ruling that promissory notes 
obtained by plaintiffs to validate a tax write-off and "to avoid any improper inquiry by 
the IRS as to the validity of the $20,000 bad debt write-off" were void and 
unenforceable because such improper purpose "would invalidate the promissory 
notes." (Tr. 395-396). Consequently, the court granted leave to plaintiffs to file an 
amended complaint in quantum meruit or unjust enrichment because the defendant 
owed plaintiffs only the amount of the sums received from plaintiffs less the amount 
of tax benefits obtained by plaintiffs from their bad debt write-off. (Tr. 396-397). 
Subsequently, the court dismissed plaintiffs amended complaint on the grounds that 
the cause of action was not founded upon contract, but equitable in nature, either 
unjust enrichment or quantum meruit, and was therefore barred by the four year 
statute of limitations, §78-12-25, Utah Code Ann. Attorney fees and costs were 
awarded to defendant. Appellants seek to have the court's order and judgment 
reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant orally requested a $13,000 loan from plaintiffs on April 14, 
1988, which request was increased to $20,000 the next day in order for defendant 
3 
to meet expenses of publishing his advertising paper. Plaintiffs advised defendant that 
they didn't have that much money and would have to borrow the money in order to 
make such a loan. (Tr. 283-287, 316-317). The defendant's response to which was 
that he would pay the same interest that the plaintiffs had to pay for the enabling 
loan. (Tr. 289-290, 316-317). Consequently, on April 15, 1988, plaintiffs increased 
their existing loan with Zions Bank to $24,000 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1), from the 
proceeds of which they issued two checks to defendant, one for $13,000 and one for 
$7,000, both dated April 15, 1988, both indicating payment "For paper", and both 
endorsed by defendant. (Exhibits 2 and 3). 
Previous business loans made by plaintiffs to defendant for his business 
had been repaid within a very short period of time (Tr. 281, 282); however, this 
$20,000 loan remained unpaid for nearly two years, requiring plaintiffs to pay in full 
the funds borrowed from Zion's Bank. (Tr. 287, 310-311). 
In 1989 plaintiffs incurred a substantial capital gain from the sale of their 
Sacramento publishing business. In 1990, to offset a small portion of that gain, 
plaintiffs were advised by their CPA to claim the unpaid loan as a loss or bad debt 
which they did in their 1989 tax return, filed on or about August 30, 1990. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 9). 
They were also advised by their CPA that it would be wise to obtain a 
signed note from defendant evidencing the debt. (Tr. 290, 320). Consequently, 
4 
plaintiff, Mary Y. Nielsen, prepared two promissory notes reflecting the oral loan 
agreement which was made when the two checks were previously delivered to 
defendant in 1988. The amounts and the dates of the notes were left blank because 
Mary had not located the checks when she prepared the notes on or about March 31 , 
1990. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 4 and 5). The date of the checks "April 15, 1988","was 
important to Mary and the defendant for proper interest accrual. (Tr. 289-290). Both 
notes were payable on demand because there was no payment date and the words 
"On demand" appeared twice on both notes. Demand for payment was expressly 
waived in the printed portion of both notes. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 4 and 5). 
After defendant had separated from plaintiffs' daughter, early in March 
of 1990, (Tr. 363), and after plaintiffs had filed their 1989 tax return, March 30, 
1990, plaintiffs, accompanied by defendant's estranged wife, presented the notes to 
defendant for his signature. (Tr. 290, 372-373). Defendant signed the notes with the 
handwritten amounts placed on them by Mary (Tr. 369), although he later denied that 
the interest rate and the words "On demand" were typed on the notes when he 
signed them. (Tr. 364-366). There was also conflict in the testimony as to the exact 
time of signing; however, defendant did admit that his signing of the notes could have 
been in 1990. (Tr. 373). 
Plaintiff, Mary Y. Nielsen, testified that she later added to each note the 
date of the checks, "4/15/88", for the purpose of proper interest accrual. She also 
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testified that she explained to defendant the missing dates when he signed the notes. 
(Tr. 290). She did not know the date of the checks until she later obtained copies of 
the cancelled checks from Zion's Bank. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2 and 3). Her testimony 
was that all other handwritten and typed additions to the original printed form notes 
had been placed thereon prior to defendant's signing said notes. (Tr. 291, 321). She 
also testified that subsequent to defendant's signing the notes, an attorney for 
plaintiffs' daughter, during her divorce proceeding against defendant, added to a copy 
of the $13,000 note the names of plaintiffs, their residence and the typed words 
"Thirteen thousand—." (Tr. 298-299). No such additions were ever made to the 
original note. Mary testified that the only addition to the notes was her adding the 
date of the two previously negotiated checks endorsed only by defendant. 
Following the execution of the promissory notes by defendant, he and 
his wife were involved in a divorce proceeding during which plaintiffs provided copies 
of the two promissory notes to defendant's attorney, with the payee inserted on the 
$13,000 note copy. (Tr. 298, 299, 327, 329). Also, Mary testified that she 
provided defendant's divorce attorney a copy of plaintiffs' 1988 Zions Bank Note. (Tr. 
327, 366, Plaintiffs'Exhibit 1). 
Although defendant denied seeing or receiving a copy of either note until 
the commencement of plaintiffs' action, on September 12, 1990, approximately six 
6 
months after the execution of said promissory notes, defendant acknowledged his 
$20,000 obligation to plaintiffs in a sworn, written answer to interrogatories. 
(Tr. 203-204, 223). Plaintiffs had discussed repayment of the $20,000 owed to 
them with both plaintiff and his partner in the printing business, Keith Caldwell, during 
which discussions a promise of payment was elicited. (Tr. 307, 308, 336). 
At the commencement of this action copies of the two notes were 
supplied by plaintiffs to their counsel as exhibits to the complaint. Counsel didn't 
become aware until the trial that the addition of payees' names, address and the 
typed "Thirteen thousand " had been added to the copy of the $13,000 note used 
as Exhibit 2 to the complaint. (Tr. 4, 343, 344). The original $13,000 note, 
however, had no such additions. (Exhibit 5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' action was in fact founded on contract, the promise of 
defendant to repay the $20,000 to plaintiffs, evidenced by two personally endorsed 
checks by defendant, two signed promissory notes by defendant and defendant's 
written acknowledgment signed under oath approximately six months following his 
signing of the promissory notes. Equitable theory of quantum meruit applies typically 
when there is no oral or written contract, not when there are both oral and written 
contracts as in the instant case. 
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The sole purpose for plaintiffs' obtaining the written notes signed by 
defendant was to secure written evidence of plaintiffs' previous loan to defendant. 
The lower court's construction or interpretation of this purpose as improper because 
the notes were used to "validate a tax write-off" (Tr. 376) or to deceive the IRS 
(Tr. 396, 401), was clearly erroneous. Plaintiffs were entitled to their bad debt write-
off with or without the promissory notes signed by defendant. 
Demand for payment is not a prerequisite to filing an action for collection 
of a demand note, especially when the written note contains a waiver of demand. A 
demand for payment is not legally required for an income tax deduction for a bad debt 
or loss. 
The appropriate limitation applicable to plaintiffs' cause is §78-12-44, 
Utah Code Ann., not the court imposed §78-12-25 which limited improperly plaintiffs' 
allowable filing time to four years, rather than the six year limitation to which plaintiffs 
are entitled, tolling from the last written and sworn acknowledgment of the debt by 
defendant, September 12, 1990. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: PLAINTIFFS' ACTION WAS IN FACT PROPERLY FOUNDED ON 
CONTRACT, NOT QUANTUM MERUIT. 
Defendant's obligation to pay plaintiff $20,000 was actually found by 
the court to be a loan, not a gift. (Tr. 387-389). Inherent in every loan transaction 
8 
is the promise of the borrower to pay back the sum borrowed. Bankers Mortgage Co. 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C C A . Tex. 142 F.2d 130, 131; First National 
Bank of Cordova v. TJOFEVIG. 244 P. 736, 738 (Oregon). Absent that obligation or 
promise, a transfer of money would be a gift unsupported by consideration. Initially, 
the funds transferred to defendant were evidenced by two personal checks endorsed 
only by defendant. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2 and 3). 
Later, defendant signed two promissory notes, promising to pay plaintiffs 
$7,000 and $13,000, the precise amounts of the previously issued checks, the funds 
from which were the consideration received by defendant for his two promissory 
notes. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 4 and 5). Both notes were payable on demand because 
no time for payment was stated. §70A-3-107, U.C.A. (1965). The words, "On 
demand", were typed twice on both notes. The $7,000 note was payable to 
plaintiffs, but the $13,000 note was payable to bearer or order because the payee 
space was left blank. State v. Donaldson. 385 P.2d 151 (1963); §70A-3-109, 
U.C.A. (1993). 
Of very special significance is the fact that defendant made a written 
acknowledgment under oath that he owed plaintiffs $20,000 approximately six 
months after he signed the promissory notes, which acknowledgment was also many 
months after, as he alleged, the plaintiffs' purported statement that they would never 
seek payment from defendant. (Tr. 223, 367). The court refused to find fraud in the 
9 
preparation of the two promissory notes (Tr. 379, 382), which is generally considered 
essential to vitiate an integrated written contract. Union Bank v. Swenson. 
707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). 
An action based on quantum meruit typically presupposes the existence 
of no enforceable written or oral contract. Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d, 264 lUtah 
App. 1987); Bailev-Allen Co.. Inc.. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994). In 
quantum meruit, because there is no real contract, equity implies a contract to 
prevent unjust enrichment. However, when there is a real contract -- oral or written -
- as in the instant case, quantum meruit and its equitable remedy do not apply. 
Justice is more directly and simply served by enforcement of the existing contract. 
POINT II: THE OBTAINING OF WRITTEN PROMISSORY NOTES TO EVIDENCE 
AN EXISTING DEBT WHICH HAD BEEN CLAIMED AS A BAD DEBT INCOME TAX 
DEDUCTION WERE NOT INVALIDATED BY THE INCOME TAX DEDUCTION CLAIM. 
Apparently the court believed the untrue legal conclusion made by 
plaintiff, MARY Y. NIELSEN, that she should get notes signed by the defendant 
because the plaintiffs' tax deduction "wouldn't be legal otherwise". (Tr. 346-347, 
388, 395, 406). The court consequently concluded that the purpose for the notes 
was to validate a tax write-off which purpose "would invalidate the promissory 
notes." (Tr. 396, 401). However, under the applicable provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code and the regulations pursuant thereto, a deduction for a non-business 
bad debt or loss may be taken in the year in which it becomes reasonably certain that 
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there will be no recovery. Int. Rev. Code of 1986, §§ 165-166; Int. Rev. Reg. 1.165-
1 D2. In the event a recovery should be obtained after the debt write-off, the amount 
of the recovery is taxable income to the noteholder who received the recovery. 
Legally, therefore, plaintiffs in this action had every right to make the election they 
made, especially in light of the fact that the loan was nearly two years old without 
payment when the claim was made on their 1989 tax return, March 30, 1990. All 
previous loans to defendant had been paid back within two months, not two years. 
(Tr. 282). 
It was patently false that plaintiffs' deduction of the $20,000 debt from 
their 1989 tax return was illegal or was rendered such by their obtaining written notes 
merely evidencing and acknowledging defendants pre-existing debt to them. The 
lower court resorted to Union Bank v. Swenson. op. cit. supra, to find support for its 
finding that plaintiffs' purpose in securing the notes from defendant, who already 
owed them $20,000, was improper. In Union Bank the signatories, merely loan 
guarantors, owed nothing to the bank prior to their signing the notes as guarantors 
of a third party's obligation to the bank. After alleged promises by the loan officer 
that they would not be liable for the borrower's debt because their signatures on the 
note were merely to satisfy bank examiners, the guarantors signed the note. Later, 
when the bank sued the guarantors on the note, they alleged misrepresentation by the 
loan officer, raising the question of fraudulent inducement. The Union Bank case 
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gives neither support nor credence to the lower court's finding of an improper 
purpose. No fraud was found in the inducement to defendant to sign the promissory 
notes in the instant case. (Tr. 379-382). 
In contrast to the guarantors in Union Bank the defendant in the instant 
case received the $20,000 consideration for the notes he signed as the primary and 
only obligor thereunder. His testimony that the plaintiffs had told him the loan would 
not have to be paid (Tr. 361, 362) appears as a mere fabrication when compared to 
his later sworn, written acknowledgment that he owed plaintiffs $20,000. (Tr. 203, 
204, 223). The fabrication becomes even clearer in light of the promise of 
defendant's business partner to make payments to plaintiffs on the $20,000 unpaid 
loan. (Tr. 307-308, 336). Plaintiffs' desire, intent and purpose to evidence an 
existing loan obligation by obtaining signed promissory notes by the obligor were 
proper, prudent and legal. 
POINT III: DEMAND FOR PAYMENT IS NEITHER A LEGAL PREREQUISITE TO 
AN ACTION FOR COLLECTION OF A DEMAND NOTE, NOR FOR AN INCOME TAX 
DEDUCTION FOR A BAD DEBT OR LOSS. 
The lower court implied that the demand for payment should have been 
made by plaintiffs both prior to filing a suit and before electing to deduct the $20,000 
loan to defendant as a bad debt or loss. (Tr. 344-345, 385-386). The record reveals, 
however, that there was possibly a demand for payment, or at least a discussion of 
payment of the notes in question with both defendant and his business partner. (Tr. 
12 
307-308, 336). Of course in regard to demand notes no demand is legally required 
prior to an action for collection. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes § 1033. No note 
of any type requires a demand for payment when payment demand is expressly 
waived by the written terms of the note as is the case with both notes in the instant 
case. Likewise, there is no rule requiring any type or form of demand prior fo an 
election by the note holder to claim his note uncollectible. The only test is subjective: 
Is it reasonably certain that there will be no recovery? It certainly was certain to 
plaintiffs who are still awaiting recovery. 
POINT IV: THE SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 78-12-44, 
U.C.A., IS THE APPROPRIATE LIMITATION APPLICABLETO PLAINTIFFS' CONTRACT 
ACTION. 
Even if the lower court's misapplication of the Union Bank case and 
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet. op. cit. supra, were correct, and the promissory notes 
were voided, that doesn't change the type or nature of plaintiffs' cause of action. 
Their claim is a legal claim, based on contract. A loan, as the court found (Tr. 387-
389), includes a promise to repay without which there is no loan or contract. Bankers 
Mortgage Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. cit. supra. Without the 
promise to pay back, a transfer of funds would be a gift; but the lower court 
specifically found that there was no gift. (Tr. 387-389). The transaction between 
plaintiffs and defendant was a loan, inherent in which is a promise to pay back. This 
loan was not created by the promissory notes which were given merely to evidence 
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the pre-existing loan. They didn't validate the loan. It was already valid. They didn't 
make it legal. It was already legal. And they didn't extinguish the prior loan as a 
judgment does. They merely confirmed it and extended the time for its legal 
collection. 
An equitable action in quantum meruit presupposes that there is no 
enforceable written or oral contract. Davies v. Olsen. op. cit. supra: Bailev-Allen Co.. 
Inc.. v. Kurzet. op. cit. supr. The court's citing Yerqensen v. Ford. 402, P2d 696 
(Utah 1965) is a misfit of the first order. In Yerqensen a judgment had extinguished 
the original claim and a new cause of action, the judgment, was substituted for it. 
Consequently, the court ruled that a judgment is not "contract" within the statute 
tolling the limitations in case of acknowledgment or part payment in an action founded 
upon contract. The instant case was founded upon contract, and the promissory 
notes evidencing the original contract did not extinguish the debt. What the 
promissory notes did in fact was extend the limitation by the written acknowledgment 
contained in the promissory notes. 
The authority of State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems, 
894 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1995), does not apply to the instant case because 
defendant's written acknowledgments of his debt to plaintiffs were within both the 
four year and six year periods of statutory limitation. No applicable statute of 
limitation had expired prior to defendant's written acknowledgments. Plaintiff's cause 
14 
of action has never been limited by any appropriate statute of limitations. Even if the 
original loan tolled from the date of the checks, April 15, 1988, it would not have 
been tolled when plaintiffs' action was commenced in 1993 because the written, 
sworn acknowledgment by defendant in 1990 would have carried the allowable time 
for filing plaintiff's action into the year 1994. At no time has plaintiffs' cause of 
action in contract been barred by any appropriate statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision and judgment should be reversed, permitting 
plaintiffs to pursue their contract action against defendant which has not yet been 
barred by any applicable statute of limitations. 
Dated this 1st day of March, 1996. 
Williarff,J. Critchlow, III 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS were mailed postage pre-paid this / C day of March, 1996, to Brad 
C. Smith at 2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
Williaffi J. Critchlow, III 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM 1 
ADDENDUM 2 
ADDENDUM 3 
ADDENDUM 4 
ADDENDUM 5 
ADDENDUM 6 
ADDENDUM 7 
Copy of $13,000 check, dated April 15, 1988. 
Copy of $7,000 check, dated April 15, 1988. 
Promissory note for $13,000, dated April 15, 1988. 
Promissory note for $7,000, dated April 15, 1988. 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated August 4, 1995. 
Order of Dismissal, dated September 18, 1995. 
Judgment, dated September 18, 1995. 
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PUIHTTIFFSEXIJIBfT 
EXHIBIT NO. ^ 
CASE NO. / L L 
DATEREtD / ' 
IN EVIDENCE 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
DATE 
/ 
The undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
at in Utah, or at such other place 
as the holder may designate in writing, the sum of: 
Dollars ($ /% &*&2}% payable 
as follows: On demand 
together, both before and after judgement, with interest on the unpaid balance 
thereof from date until paid at the rate of per cent ( %) 
per annum, interest payable as follows: 12,5 percent simple interest. On demand. 
Prepayment of this note with interest to date of payment may be made at any 
time without penalty. 
If the holder deems itself insecure or if default be made in payment of the 
whole or any part of any installment at the time when or the place where the 
same becomes due and payable as aforesaid, then the entire unpaid balance, 
with interest as aforesaid, shall, at the election of the holder hereof and 
without notice of said election at once become due and payable* In event of 
any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and severally, 
agree to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attorney°s fees, legal expenses 
and lawful collection costs in addition to all other sums due hereunder. 
Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of time without 
notice are hereby waived and the undersigned consent to the release of any 
security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
ADDRESS 
3 / J y 
ADDRESS 
This note is secured by Signature 3*31-90 - on demand PUWTIFFSEXHlBi 
EXHIBIT NO. _ ^ _ 
CASINO. 
DATE R£C0 / n<T c 
ID EVIDENCE A ^ I ' 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
DATE JJ - /C 19 % $ 
/ 
The undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
— Nelden f . ane\/nr Mary Y. MJgUgn 
at in Utah, or at such other place 
as the holder may designate in writing, the sum of: 
Dollars ($ /,/*Q0 ' )> payable 
as follows:
 o n demand 
together, both before and after judgement, with interest on the unpaid balance 
thereof from date until paid at the rate of per cent ( %) 
per annum, interest payable as follows: 12.5 percent simple interest. On demand. 
Prepayment of this note with interest to date of payment may be made at any 
time without penalty. 
If the holder deems itself insecure or if default be made in payment of the 
whole or any part of any installment at the time when or the place where the 
same becomes due and payable as aforesaid, then the entire unpaid balance, 
with interest as aforesaid, shall, at the election of the holder hereof and 
without notice of said election at once become due and payable. In event of 
any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and severally, 
agree to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attorney°s fees, legal expenses 
and lawful collection costs in addition to all other sums due hereunder. 
Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of time without 
notice are hereby waived and the undersigned consent to the release of any 
security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
ADDRESS •'/ £/rt rjg&c 
ADDRESS 
This note is secured by signafnrA ?-?l-?n - on H»m*nH PLAINTIFFS EXH 
EXHIBIT HO. £ 
CASE HO. ^ 
DATEMCD / O * 
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NELDEN C. NIELSEN and MARY Y. 
NIELSEN. 
Plaintiffs, 
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PHILIP WARREN, 
Defendant. 
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 RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 930700084 
The Court has reviewed the memoranda filed by Plaintiffs and Defendant on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as the exhibits submitted in opposition to said motion. 
In addition, the Court has likewise reviewed the other documents on file with the Court. 
Having done so, and now being fully advised, it is the Court's conclusion pursuant to Rule 12 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be granted. 
I The Court finds that on or about March 22, 1993, Plaintiffs filed a contract 
action against Defendant in the Second District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, seeking 
enforcement of two promissory notes in amounts totalling S20,000.00, as well as interest 
thereon, reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
2. That on January 25, 1995, the Court held a trial on Plaintiffs' contract action at 
which time the Court determined the promissory notes were invalid and unenforceable. 
Nevertheless, the Court found that Plaintiffs loaned money to Defendant on or about April 15, 
1988 and therefor granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint stating a cause of 
action under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. 
3. That on May 2, 1995, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. 
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4. That on or about May 16, 1995, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the 
basis that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was barred by the statute of limitations, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25, which applies to matters of equity.. 
5. That the application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 is limited to actions 
founded upon contract, Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965). In that 
case, a judgement had been rendered in an action upon three promissory notes. Following the 
judgement, but within the applicable statutory period, the judgement debtors entered into a 
written agreement acknowledging the obligation and thereafter made payments on the debt. 
Shortly after the statute of limitations had run, plaintiff filed an action and argued that Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-44 tolled the statute as of the date of the acknowledgment, to which the 
Court responded that M[w]hereas the common law rule tolls the limitation period in case of an 
acknowledgment or part payment in all actions, the foregoing statute restricts it only to those 
actions founded upon contract. Yergensen at 399, 697. The Utah Supreme Court thereafter 
stated that the proper application of the statute was to a category of assumpsit founded on a 
promise, as fol lows: 
The doctrine relating to acknowledgment or part payment applies only to cases 
founded upon assumpsit and has no application where the action does not rest 
upon a promise. To suspend the operation of the statute, the obligation upon 
which the action is based must be founded upon a promise and must not be in 
debt or covenant or in actions in effect the same. 
id at 399, 698. 
An action of assumpsit is "a common-law form of action which allows for recovery of 
damages for nonperformance of contract, whether express or implied, written or verbal, as 
well as quasi-contractual obligations." Schulz v. Honsador. Inc.. 690 P.2d 279. 281 (Haw. 
1984). An action of debt is included in the action of assumpsit and is the appropriate form of 
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action to enforce a duty or obligation to pay money. Laughlin v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of St. 
Louis. 189 S.W.2d 974, 979 (Mo. 1945). 
An action in quantum meruit, like an action of debt, is one of the forms of an action 
in assumpsit. Laughlin at 979. The Texas Supreme Court characterized quantum meruit as 
"an equitable remedy which does not arise out of contract, but is independent of it." Vortt 
Exploration Co.. Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A.. Inc.. 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990). That court 
then further discussed quantum meruit as follows: 
Generally, a parry may recover under quantum meruit only when there is no 
express contract covering the services or materials furnished. This remedy is 
based upon the promise implied by law to pay for beneficial services rendered 
and knowingly accepted. Recovery in quantum meruit will be had when non-
payment for the services rendered would result in an unjust enrichment to the 
party benefited by the work. IcT at 944. 
This Court's findings, particularly number two (2) above, characterizing the payment of 
money by Plaintiffs to Defendant as a loan, are consistent with this statement of quantum 
meruit Nevertheless, as noted above, Plaintiffs' action is not properly founded on contract, 
thus precluding application of § 78-12-44. Consequently, the statute of limitations has run 
on Plaintiffs' cause of action. 
Thus, based on the facts and reasons set forth above, the Court hereby grants both 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and request for an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
Dated August 4, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
—!erA-
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on the ( 
of August, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
2605 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
David J. Peters 
Attorney at Law 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84410 
William J. Critchlow, III 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
P.O Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
^gu~/ firilL-j 
Brent M. Burningham 
Law Clerk to the Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
Addendum 5 
FiLED IN CLERK'S 0??*CE 
r . f v , " " • • " • ' ' • • " • '• ' " 
SEP ZO I Z 2 U P H ' 9 5 
CLERK. 2*J:-B!S"I. COURT 
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Attorney for Defendant Philip Warren 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WE3ER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NELDEN C. NIELSEN and MARY Y. 
NIELSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PHILIP WARREN, 
Defendant. 
PHILIP WARREN, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
APRILE WARREN, 
Third Party Defendant. 
ORDER 
I Civil 
Judge 
OF DISMISSAL 
No. 930700084 
Jon M. Memmott 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
came on regularly for hearing on 18 June 1995. Defendant was not 
present in court but was represented by counsel, Brad C. Smith. 
Plaintiffs were not present in court but were represented by 
counsel, William J. Critchlow, III. Having reviewed the 
pleadings on file and having heard the arguments and 
representations of counsel, the Court issued a Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which held that Defendant's Motion 
to Dis-miss was granted. 
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Therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
The Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice 
as it is time-barred. 
The Defendant is awarded his reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in the Motion to Dismiss, which fees and 
costs may be established by his attorney's affidavit. 
DATED this ^ ^ a y of SaftX - , 1995. 
District Court Judge 
RULE 4-504 NOTICE 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, the undersigned will submit the foregoing ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL to Judge Jon M. Memmott of the Second Judicial 
District Court of Davis County, for signature upon the expiration 
21 
of EIGHT days from 3^ August 1995, unless written objection is 
filed prior to that time. 
BRAD C. SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the foregoing Order of Dismissal, this 2-( day of August, 1995, 
to William R. Critchlow III, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 2610 
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401 and David J. Peters 505 
South Main, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
/U<0^K /Xistst?^ 
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Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
David S. Kunz, No. 1864 
Attorney for Defendant Philip Warren 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NELDEN C. NIELSEN and MARY Y. 
NIELSEN, 
Plaintiffs, JUDGMENT 
vs. 
PHILIP WARREN, 
Defendant. 
PHILIP WARREN, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
APRILE WARREN, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Civil No. 930700084 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
came on regularly for hearing on 18 June 1995. Defendant was not 
present in court but was represented by counsel, Brad C. Smith. 
Plaintiffs were not present in court but were represented by 
counsel, William J. Critchlow, III. Having reviewed the 
pleadings on file and having heard the arguments and 
representations of counsel, the Court issued a Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which held that Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss was granted, 
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Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that 
Plaintiffs/ Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Defendant is awarded the sum of $850.00 for attorneys fees 
together with $372.50 in costs from Plaintiffs', jointly and 
severally, together with his costs and interest at the 
lawful rate until paid and it is further ordered that this 
judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable 
costs and attorneys fees expended in collecting said 
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established 
by affidavit. 
DATED this 1 8 ^ day of SoXTT - , 1995. 
-J frv\ 
:ict 'Court Judge District Court Judge 
RULE 4-504 NOTICE 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, the undersigned will submit the foregoing ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL to Judge Jon M. Memmott of the Second Judicial 
District Court of Davis County, for signature upon the expiration 
of EIGHT days from S^August 1995, unless written objection is 
filed prior to that time. 
P^^Jj^^^^c^ 
BRAD C. SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the foregoing Order of Dismissal, this 2~/ day of August, 1995, 
to William R. Critchlow III, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 2610 
Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401 and David J. Peters 505 
South Main, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
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